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ABSTRACT 
Within the last three years, Homeland Security (HLS) has emerged as a new focus 
for local law enforcement agencies throughout the nation.  While local police must 
effectively address community needs associated with crime and quality of life, they are 
also now on the front lines of the nation’s battle against the forces of international 
terrorism.  Using existing knowledge (derived primarily from the emergency 
management field), police agencies have worked to develop locally relevant, viable and 
available expertise in the developing field of HLS.  If federal estimates are accurate, 
however, a critical mass of these experts will retire within the next five years.    As these 
organizational experts approach retirement, their communities will be forced to deal with 
the consequences of an exodus of fundamental knowledge, experience and expertise.  
Police organizations will be challenged to continue the efficient delivery of homeland 
security services absent the experts who were instrumental in developing the field.  
Existing research in Knowledge Management (KM) may offer some guidance to 
managing this problem. KM seeks to offer organizational guidance on how to identify 
knowledge generation processes and then leverage, maintain and manage knowledge 
assets within an organization.1  This thesis seeks to explore the potential application of 
KM theories to the real challenges faced by local police agencies in the National Capitol 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE  
Within the last three years, Homeland Security (HLS) has emerged as a new focus 
for local law enforcement agencies throughout the nation.  In addition to addressing 
community needs associated with crime, local police are now on the front lines of the 
nation’s battle against the forces of international terrorism.  This critical responsibility 
was heaped upon police agencies already bearing a formidable workload; however, most 
agencies, especially those in metropolitan areas, have adjusted their operations to 
incorporate HLS management, aided significantly by billions of dollars in federal HLS 
funding.  Using existing knowledge (derived primarily from the emergency management 
field), police agencies have worked to develop locally relevant, viable and available 
expertise on HLS management.  Just as existing expertise provided the springboard, those 
subject matter experts (SMEs) already in-house were also pressed into service to identify 
and address HLS needs and challenges.  Many of these experts are middle- and senior-
level managers with decades of experience, coupled with distinct perspectives born of 
individually unique areas of expertise that are now being merged into the HLS 
management function.   
Most significantly, if federal estimates are accurate, a critical mass of these 
experts will retire within the next five years.  GAO estimates indicate that over 50% of 
the federal workforce will be eligible to retire in the next five years, and that nearly three-
quarters of these employees are senior executives.2   Additionally, the interest in securing 
the homeland has given birth to a new private industry that will likely attempt to leverage 
the same pool of experts.  So, while local agencies attempt to manage the demands of the 
emerging science that is HLS, police managers and leaders face the challenge of 
protecting their communities while the pools of viable knowledge and experience, 
critically relevant to the newly defined mission, appear to be either immediately 
threatened or shrinking fast.   
 
2 Walker, D. (2000).  Managing human capital in the 21st century. GAO. Washington, D.C.: USGPO 
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The purpose of this work is to identify a practical process whereby critical, 
fundamental and still-developing knowledge relevant to HLS can be isolated and 
captured for continuing organizational use. The research outcome offers a suggested 
framework or starting point for the development of a model policy in this critical area.  
The pending potential exodus of this critical HLS knowledge base is an emerging and 
apparently unacknowledged challenge for Chiefs of Police nationwide, and this thesis is 
intended to both raise the profile of this problem on a local level and offer an option to 
negotiate some of the obstacles associated with this pressing, but not fully-defined 
challenge.   
B.  IMPORTANCE 
1.  Impact of the Attacks of 9-11 
The National Capital Region (NCR) of the Metropolitan Washington D.C area 
was directly and profoundly impacted by the attacks of September 11, 2001.  The 
Pentagon is located in Arlington County, Virginia, which lies nearly at the geographical 
heart of the NCR.  Many of the 64 people aboard the jetliner that crashed into the 
Pentagon, and many others among the 125 killed in the Pentagon, were long-term, 
permanent residents of the area.3  The attacks had an immediate operational impact for all 
emergency service providers in Arlington County and within all “bordering and 
surrounding jurisdictions.”4 Furthermore, the response “overcame the inherent 
complications of a response across jurisdictions because the Incident Command System, 
a formalized management structure for emergency response, was in place in the National 
Capital Region on 9/11.”5  Additional critical success factors for the response were 
strong, pre-existing relationships among the responding agencies, along with a regional 
approach to emergency management.   
Local hospitals and burn unit populations were swollen as the injured were taken 
to various locations throughout the region for specialized treatment.  When the attacks 
occurred, live pictures and reports of the fire at the Pentagon beamed across the local 
television station airwaves.  The nationally significant event was reported as local news 
 
3 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States. New York: W.W. Norton Company 
4 Ibid., p. 314 
5 Ibid., p. 314 
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and the ramifications were nearly immediate.   When Federal Government offices closed 
early and unexpectedly, hundreds of thousands of employees and government contractors 
streamed into the transportation infrastructure and proceeded almost immediately to clog 
major arteries throughout the region to the point of gridlock.  While the response to the 
incident was immediate, due to a variety of factors the infrastructure support was very 
uncoordinated and slow to shift into rush-hour mode, where capacity is increased and 
travel is timed and coordinated throughout the region.  Local police agencies engaged in 
mass call-backs of off-duty personnel in order to provide increased security at many 
high-profile and high-risk locations, and general increased visibility designed to assuage 
high levels of public anxiety.  Local fire departments notified Arlington, Va. authorities 
of their availability to assist.  Many resources were unilaterally dispersed to the scene. 
In the aftermath and deconstruction of the response to the attack, authorities in 
Arlington were praised for their effective emergency management and coordinated 
response.  What became clear was that the method and ability for achieving this outcome 
was not consistent throughout the region.  Given that Washington D.C. and the adjacent 
region, in its role as the seat of national government, offers significant appeal as a terror 
target, it was accepted generally that a larger scale attack was possible, if not likely, and 
that the region needed to move toward improved local and coordinated HLS capabilities. 
During the intervening years since 2001, many local police and fire agencies have 
benefited significantly from the availability of federal funding for enhanced HLS 
operations.  While these agencies have obtained equipment and some training, other 
adjustments have been slower to occur.  Local police agencies still differ dramatically in 
the level of emphasis placed on the HLS function.  There is little consistency in staffing, 
structure or process, which presents obvious challenges, specifically among police 
agencies, should they be required to engage in emergency coordination.  The pace of 
progress on mutual aid agreements has slowed due to a variety of issues, including 
concerns over civil liability.  The lack of signed agreements impedes communication, 
further complicates the development of coordinated response plans and practically 




                                                
2.  Thesis Focus 
The focus of this thesis is upon local-level HLS experts in police organizations in 
the NCR.  While the organizational processes that have unfolded in response to the 
challenge of HLS management may appear to be progressing nicely, the process is 
neither predictable, nor is it without pitfalls.  As indicated previously, GAO estimates 
indicate that approximately 50% of mid-to-senior-level managers at the federal level will 
become eligible for retirement in the next five years.6 Given that this estimate is based 
upon fairly recent census data, these figures can very likely be generalized to local- and 
state-level government workforces.  Within local law enforcement, many of the 
individuals engaged in developing the new body of knowledge relevant to homeland 
security are middle- and senior-level managers.  The likely consequence of the exodus of 
experienced managers who are helping to develop the local-level homeland security body 
of expertise is a potentially crippling knowledge loss within a developing knowledge 
area.   
While these experts are currently and actively engaged in developing the entirely 
new field of knowledge that is HLS management, local law enforcement agencies remain 
disengaged from effective Knowledge Management (KM) and succession planning 
processes.  Training for middle and senior managers in law enforcement is still frequently 
of a nature that is unstructured, haphazard and on-the-job.7  “Leaders toss people willy-
nilly into new situations, incurring the costs of trial and error learning instead of those 
associated with more carefully planned transitions.”8  In the end, local police agency 
chiefs do not know what their employees know, and have no consistently effective way to 
capture or transfer that knowledge before these employees leave the workforce.  
Frequently, this type of dynamic emerges by default in smaller police agencies that lack 
the internal support for formal mentoring.  These practices continue at an exorbitant and 
unsustainable cost in the face of the pressing challenges relevant to HLS management.  
As these organizational experts approach and engage retirement, those who remain will 
 
6 Walker, D. 
7 Sprafka, H. and Kranda, A. (2000). Best practices of institutionalizing mentoring into police 
departments.  Available at http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/publications/mentoring.pdf [last 
accessed August 2, 2005] 
8 Leonard, D. and Swap, W.  (2004).  Deep Smarts.  Harvard Business Review On-line Version.  
September.  Available at http://hbsp.org [last accessed August 2, 2005] 
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be forced to deal with the exodus of fundamental knowledge, experience and expertise.  
Police organizations will be challenged to continue the efficient delivery of homeland 
security services, absent the experts who were instrumental in developing the field.   
C.  SOLUTION  
In law enforcement, knowledge about criminal activities or specific groups 
and individuals tends to be learned by officers who work in 
specific…areas.  The information is often lost with personnel changes and 
has to be re-acquired by new officers.9
Existing research in Knowledge Management (KM) may offer some guidance to 
managing this problem; however, HLS is a newly developing field and there is no 
longitudinal history upon which to rely in order to fill the void created by an exodus of 
expertise.  The challenge for local agencies, therefore, involves implementation of a 
procedure that will allow local Chiefs of Police to first identify what their experts know, 
and then activate an organizational process to capture that knowledge before these 
experts retire. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to seek to identify a practical 
method whereby that critical, fundamental and still-developing knowledge can be 
isolated and captured for continuing organizational use. 
Knowledge Management (KM) is a burgeoning science that attempts to quantify 
human capabilities and identify and implement strategies for the efficient sharing of 
knowledge within organizations. KM is a term that is used to indicate how, among other 
things, knowledge can be embedded into both individual and combined organizational 
processes.10  It is also a burgeoning science that attempts to enable the quantification of 
human   capabilities  and   the  identification  and   implementation  of   strategies  for  the 
efficient sharing of knowledge within organizations.11    KM seeks to offer organizational 
guidance on how to identify knowledge generation processes and then leverage, maintain 
and manage knowledge assets within an organization.12   
 
9 Atabakhsh, H. et al.  (2001). Coplink Knowledge Management for Law Enforcement:  text analysis, 
visualization and collaboration.  National Conference on Digital Government (white paper) 
10 Rowley, J. (1999).  What is knowledge management?  Library Management, 20-8 416-419 
11 Rumizen, M. (2002).  The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Knowledge Management.  Indianapolis: Alpha 
Books 
12 Liebowitz, J. (1999) 
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 There are many levels of potential application of KM theories to the problems 
and challenges of HLS management.  The consideration of managing knowledge assets 
becomes fairly critical given the pending retirements and the threats posed by the 
potential loss of organizational knowledge at all levels of government.  When applied to 
developing disciplines like homeland security, the ramifications could be staggering. The 
facilitation of the continuing development of knowledge relevant to homeland security 
issues is an emerging, important and dynamic public safety task.  To ensure that the 
continuity of this field of knowledge survives the development stage, during the exodus 
of knowledge, skill and expertise that will occur as baby-boomers retire, is critical to the 
security of individual communities and to the nation as a whole.  Generally, law 
enforcement professionals do not yet have the grasp of homeland security as a discipline 
that will be required to ensure the safety of their local communities on a continuing basis.  
The predictable exodus of pools of local-level expertise will quickly render that grasp 
even more tenuous.   
D.  CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter I is intended to offer a summary description of the dilemma that is the 
focus of this thesis.  Chapter II will provide an overview of KM to include a review of 
relevant literature, along with some conceptual models that appear relevant to the 
research question.  These models will be used as the foundation for discussion and 
recommendations.  Chapter III will describe the methodology utilized in this 
presentation.  Chapter IV will offer a discussion of results that will focus on the current 
state of local HLS management by select police agencies in the Metropolitan Washington 
Council of Governments (COG) region.  Specifically, Chapter IV will offer a description 
of contexts relevant to the HLS managers interviewed for this work, along with the 
relevant findings regarding identified knowledge areas and skills that these managers 
identify as most relevant to HLS management within their individual jurisdictions.    
Chapter V will identify and offer a general discussion of the significant findings and 
implications generated in this study and will conclude with recommendations for further 




                                                
II. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 
A. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT DEFINED 
Knowledge Management (KM) is a term that is used to describe a variety of 
organizational processes, and according to Yang (2004), the territory of KM is 
“enormous and its boundaries are ambiguous.”13 KM is also a term that is used to 
indicate how, among other things, knowledge can be embedded into both individual and 
combined organizational processes.14  KM is a burgeoning science that attempts to enable 
the quantification of human capabilities and the identification and implementation of 
strategies for the efficient sharing of knowledge within organizations.15    KM also seeks 
to offer organizational guidance on how to identify knowledge generation processes and 
then leverage, maintain and manage knowledge assets within organizations.16  The field 
of KM was born of the transition from the industrial age to the information age, and it is 
based upon the assumption that corporate assets are currently represented most potently 
within the intellectual capital held by organizational members.17
B. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
By way of definition, the literature offers little in the way of one-stop shopping, 
due to the influence that varying research perspectives have had upon the end products.18  
Generally and simplistically, the literature represents KM as an evolutionary process 
whereby an organization attempts to leverage and distribute, to the maximum extent 
possible, its own “knowledge assets” in pursuit of the organizational mission.19 The term 
‘Knowledge’ refers to explicit, tacit, historical and subjective types of ideas, constructs, 
thoughts and beliefs as they travel through the filters of an organization’s human 
 
13 Yang, J. (2004). Job related knowledge sharing: comparative case studies. Journal of Knowledge 
Management, 8-3, 118-126,  p. 119 
14 Rowley, J. 
15 Rumizen, M. 
16 Liebowitz, J. (1999) 
17 Housel, T. and Bell, A. (2001). Measuring and Managing Knowledge. New York: McGraw-Hill 
18 Beckett (2000). A characterization of corporate memory as a knowledge system.  Journal of 
Knowledge Management, 4-4, 311-319 
19 Kanter, J. (1999).  Knowledge management, practically speaking.  Information Systems 
Management, 7-15 
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resources, structure, culture and communication processes.20  Management, in this 
context, regards those processes associated with the creation, identification, sharing, 
transfer and maintenance of that knowledge.21  Essential characteristics of KM include 
the ability to identify, warehouse, propagate and mine both knowledge that the 
organization is aware of and that which is implicit in its assets.22  Especially in fluid or 
developing disciplines, like HLS for instance, the strength of those assets is determined 
most significantly by human resources, due in part to the lack of longitudinal 
understanding and bench-marking of the developing discipline. 
Organizational processes most readily associated with KM include the access, 
generation, documentation, embedding, transfer and use of knowledge within an 
organization that effectively generates a continuing modification in organizational 
behavior.23  Within the context of facilitating a continual growth process, the 
measurement (benchmarking) and assessment of the value of organizational knowledge 
(knowledge lifecycle management) also play key, if more subtle, roles within an 
effectively executed KM process.24
On this more subtle level, the organization must, at least within the context of 
KM, enable internal focus on its strategic pillars of people, processes and technology in 
such a manner that three results are generated:25  First, van den Hoof and de Ridder 
(2004) offer that the organization must be structured in such a manner as to enable its 
people to share their agency cultures across functional silos, thereby facilitating the 
smooth transition of existing knowledge toward the creation of new knowledge.26   
Second, the organization’s processes must be ordered in such a manner that will allow 
 
20 Housel, T. and Bell, A.   
21 Rowley, J.  
22 Rumizen, M. 
23 Garvin, D. (1993). Building a learning organization. Harvard Business Review on Knowledge 
Management. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing 
24 Leung, et al. (2004).  Benchmarking the role-modification process for successful knowledge 
transfer.  Benchmarking: An International Journal, 11-6, 601-609 
25 Liebowitz, J. (1999) 
26 van den Hoof, B. and de Ridder, J. (2004). Knowledge sharing in context: the influence of 
organizational commitment, communication, climate and CMC use on knowledge sharing.  Journal of 
Knowledge Management, 8-6, 117-130 
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systematic sharing of critical information among organizational layers, a process which 
remains frequently elusive in many types of agencies.27  Finally, these processes must 
also then enable the embedding of tacit knowledge into organizational processes.   Lopez 
et al. (2004), offer that the resulting ‘ideal’ climate will ultimately facilitate the 
establishment of a unified knowledge network.28   
Certainly, volumes have been written about KM as a topic, as a process and as an 
outcome.  There is also extensive and recent research on KM applications; however, 
Syed-Ikhsan and Rowland (2004) indicate that comparatively little of this material 
appears to deal extensively with the application of KM within the context of public 
organizations.   So, while there is apparently less KM initiative occurring within the 
public sector, the opportunity for application within government organizations appears to 
be ripe, especially as those applications regard developing disciplines.   
Sawy and Majchrzak (2004) indicate that, in the face of the “unknowables” that 
characterize developing knowledge areas, KM becomes even more complex, knowledge 
creation cycles spin faster and the consequences for the mismanagement of knowledge 
become more profound.29  The critical type of evolving discipline represented by HLS, 
therefore, appears to invite KM in real-time, especially given the potential life-and-death 
implications for failure.  This paper is thus predicated upon the general thesis that it is at 
this early stage in the development cycle of the discipline of HLS that key KM principles 
should be introduced, especially in law enforcement agencies and most relevantly at the 
local level.    The need is punctuated by the age demographic of those who are actively 
developing the discipline. 
C. RELEVANT DEFINITIONS  
For purposes of this thesis, it is important to offer as a baseline certain definitions 
and critical distinctions.  Davenport and Prusak (1998) offer basic but important 
distinctions of key terms that are frequently and mistakenly interchanged.  These 
 
27 Syed-Ikhsan, S. and Rowland, R. (2004). Knowledge management in a public organization: a study 
on the relationship between culture and organizational learning.  Journal of Knowledge Management, 8-2, 
95-111 
28 Lopez, S., Peon, J. and Ordas, C. (2004).  Measuring knowledge: the link between culture and 
organizational learning.  Journal of Knowledge Management, 8-6, 93-104 
29 Sawy, O. and Majchrzak, A. (2004). Critical issues in research on real-time knowledge management 
in enterprises. Journal of Knowledge Management, 8-4, 21-37 
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foundational terms include data, information and knowledge.  Data is defined as “a set of 
discrete, objective facts about events.”30   They argue that data has no inherent meaning 
and that too much data can make decision making harder.  Information is defined as a 
“message” designed to change the perceptions of the receiver.  The receiver of that 
message, and not the sender, decides upon the value of the message.  “Data becomes 
information when its creator adds meaning.”31  Knowledge, they assert, is the human 
process of transforming information through various fluid and static processes and 
actions, including comparison, analysis of implications and relationships, and the use of 
conversation.    
These definitions will be used as the baseline definitions for this work, as they 
effectively differentiate between data, information and knowledge.  Data are a set of 
objective facts.  Information is data that has been subjected, by the receiver, to a process 
whereby the data has been given meaningful form and has altered the receiver’s 
perceptions, beliefs and actions.  Critically, it is the receiver, not the sender, who 
determines whether data becomes information, and this outcome results from five general 
processes.  These processes include contextualization, categorization, calculation, 
correction and condensation.32  While some of these processes invite technological 
enhancement some, like providing context, remain inherently human activities.33
Knowledge is also a human-oriented characteristic.  Books, memoranda, policies 
and other information tools may be effective, interesting or informative (to the point, as 
indicated above, that they alter behaviors and actions), but these tools are not 
knowledgeable.  “Knowledge derives from minds at work.”34  It occurs and exists in 
people’s  minds.  It is  both  rigid and  fluid.  Knowledge  emerges from information after  
 
30 Davenport, T. and Prusak, L. (1998).  Working Knowledge.  Boston: Harvard Business School Press 
31 Ibid., p. 4.  The authors also indicate that there are 5 ‘Cs’ relevant to the transformation of data into 
information.  These include: Contextualization; Categorization; Calculation; Correction; and Condensation. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid., p. 5 
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the information is subjected to inherently human processes like conversation, 
determination of relationships, understanding of implications and the ability to derive 
comparisons and contrasts between and among past experiences and situations. 
D. CONCEPTUAL MODEL OVERVIEWS 
Much of the literature serves to offer conceptual models relevant to the 
application of KM in various types of organizations.  The following models were selected 
for inclusion into this work due to their relevance to KM challenges in public agencies.  It 
is clear, however, that the degree of relevance varies according to key factors, including 
culture, cost and practicality.  It is the goal of this presentation to isolate 
recommendations that are practical.  Accordingly, any outcome must consider existing 
police culture, recommendations must be capable of being incorporated at low or no cost, 
and they must be realistic given the criticality of the service demands in public safety.  
That is, due to the true life-and-death nature of day-to-day activities, KM cannot become 
the focus, necessarily, of these organizations’ work.  To the degree possible, KM 
processes have to be melded into existing processes, using existing resources, with the 
goal of generating meaningful KM progress in the short-term. 
1. Conceptual Model I 
Liebowitz (2003) offers a suggested model for KM implementation in an 8000-
member government organization that is based upon “people, processes and culture.”35    
Liebowitz implies that technology is more means than end.    He also indicates that 
successful KM implementation rests upon the establishment of basic KM tenets, 
including: integration of knowledge sharing, informing organizational members about the 
benefits of sharing, encouraging the process of learning from failure, educating 
organizational members on varying types and uses of knowledge, enhancing rewards and 
recognition and, finally, overlaying appropriate IT methodologies.  Objectively, it is 
difficult to argue that these steps, engaged in a clinical environment, would not yield 
positive results.  On a practical level, it appears that these steps are based upon certain 
assumptions that may prove somewhat problematic in smaller organizations, or in 
organizations with cultural characteristics that vary dramatically from the more cerebral 
one that Liebowitz researched.   
 
35 Liebowitz, J. (2003). A knowledge management implementation plan at a leading US technical 
government organization: a case study.  Knowledge and Process Management, 10:4, pp. 254-259, p. 255 
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Indeed, with regard to the limited sample of local agencies surveyed for this work, 
certain important questions and concerns arise.  First, in command and control 
organizations (like police agencies), it is unclear how, specifically, knowledge sharing 
can be better integrated into each member’s job.  It is also not clear what basic 
communication processes need to be in place to ensure that members can better 
understand the benefits of knowledge sharing.  Furthermore, from a cultural perspective it 
is uncertain how, in very rigorous, para-military organizations, failure can be effectively 
protected, let alone encouraged.  Finally, within organizations with rigid labor 
environments, it can be extremely difficult to adjust reward structures to encourage 
results that may vary from the more tangible goals of the employees’ representative 
organizations.   
If Liebowitz’s model is to be relevantly generalized to a smaller, less 
technologically based organization or culture (like policing), these issues require some 
consideration, along with selectivity and strategy.  Furthermore, while Liebowitz offers 
meaningful expected outcomes, it appears that the ability to offer objective near-term 
measures of success is incomplete.    These preferred outcomes include notoriously hard-
to-measure items like the establishment of a knowledge-sharing environment, a “strong 
sense of community,” increased collaboration and embedded KM processes.  He also 
indicates that “Success will ultimately be measured in terms of innovation, people 
retention, knowledge retention, productivity and ‘mission success’.”   
With regard to organizational assets, Liebowitz offers that Knowledge 
Management Officers, Knowledge Stewards and Knowledge Retention Officers are 
responsible for knowledge retention at the organization, department and project levels, 
respectively.  In a large organization, such as the one represented in the Liebowitz study, 
these positions may prove beneficial, but in smaller, leaner and locally funded 
organizations, these important functions rarely survive budget scrutiny and, therefore, 
must be absorbed by other workers if they are to be completed.  None of the participant 
organizations in this study list any of the above position titles on their organizational 
charts.  
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Because of its inclusion of culture as an important pillar, implementation of this 
conceptual model at the local level could prove beneficial, but will undoubtedly require 
more distillation and the construction of more concrete measurement tools.  In essence, 
the Liebowitz model clearly represents KM as new work with new capacity, in the form 
of the introduction of Chief Information Officer positions among other expansions.  The 
critical distinction, therefore, is the lack of new capacity in the organizations studied for 
this work.  The challenge in HLS management for local police involves the 
precariousness of meeting existing and developing demands, without the commensurate 
development of additional capacity.   
2. Conceptual Model II 
Neville and Powell (2004) proposed an interactive system for the capture and use 
of both explicit and tacit knowledge in a university environment.  The proposed 
“Knowledge Base Support Environment” system was developed for use in an academic 
environment and relies heavily upon the availability and utilization of the internet as a 
tool that enables users to surpass the traditional limitations imposed by the classroom 
environment.36  Most critically, they note that the system as proposed will “grow and 
change as both staff and students collaborate to add and extract material…” and that 
“[d]uplication of work” will be dramatically reduced.37 The environment itself can be 
used by organizations in training and in the management and creation of knowledge.”  If 
groups are basically defined as “people who are aware of one another and have the 
opportunity to communicate,” cooperate and collaborate to varying degrees, then the 
HLS mangers interviewed for this work are, at least within the KM context, not a group, 
as no formal opportunity for collaborative interaction exists currently.  These individuals 
are only generally aware of their counterparts and there is no structured opportunity in 
which they engage in relevant communication.38   
 
 
36 Neville, K. and Powell, P.  (2004). An interactive system for the collection and utilization of both 
tacit and explicit knowledge.  Creating Knowledge Based Organizations.  Hershey: Idea Group Publishing, 
p. 169 
37 Ibid., p. 172 
38 Ibid., p. 172   
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The Neville and Powell model focuses on critical aspects of the KM challenges 
similarly faced by the local police HLS managers, in that it deals specifically with the 
creation of knowledge through the promotion of group collaboration and cooperation 
through the use of a readily available resource (the Internet).  Furthermore, the 
components of this model are highly relevant due to the stated focus on eliminating 
traditional limitations (represented by classrooms, in this case) and making group 
boundaries more permeable.  In essence, the model advocates a redefinition of the group.  
This is an absolutely critical component of any KM solution for local police, who remain, 
to varying degrees, parochial and distinctively territorial.  If it is accepted that one of the 
general goals of KM is efficiency through the elimination of redundant effort, then 
recommendations must acknowledge that HLS managers, regardless of agency affiliation, 
must form a new group and share knowledge across organizational boundaries.   
3. Conceptual Model III   
Montano (2004) similarly offers that virtual communities play a critical role in the 
overall success of KM efforts.  Both virtual communities and communities of practice 
provide for the sense of sharing, creation and archiving of knowledge for future use.  
Communities of practice develop to identify solutions to the organization of groups’ most 
pressing problems.  Virtual Communities (VCs) are defined as groups with a formal 
notion of membership that lack a physical commonality, but who share common 
practices, interests and relationships.39   
Montano’s study essentially focuses on three processes that are fundamental to 
the problem of HLS KM for local police.  These processes include defining and 
understanding the role of technology, determining how that technology can enable KM, 
and defining and describing barriers that are created or eliminated by the use of 
technology.  The study suggests that the creation of structured, virtual communities of 
practice may provide at least some of the answers to the research question in this study, 




39 Montano, B. (2004). Virtual Communities as role models for organizational knowledge 
management.  In Gupta, J. and Sharma (Eds.), Creating Knowledge Based Organizations 
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The assets and advantages of this conceptual model appear to align favorably with 
the critical challenges that local police agencies face with regard to HLS KM.  The 
interviews conducted for this thesis revealed that the organizations represented in this 
study do not facilitate knowledge sharing, as they similarly do not engage systematic 
archiving.40   This deficiency appears to call out for a community approach. 
4. Conceptual Model IV 
Davis  (2004) indicates that longitudinal focus on five KM principles can be 
critical to the success or failure of any KM initiative. It is important to highlight these 
operating principles at the beginning of the process cycle; the list includes alignment, 
ownership, global perspective, effective evaluative criteria and realism.41  It is also 
important to ensure that there exists an alignment between processes and outcomes. 
Encouraging participants to feel a part of the work, facilitation of a big-picture focus, 
iterative evaluation, adjustment and realistic assessments exemplify these desired 
objectives.  This model indicates that knowledge management cannot effectively occur 
without the understanding of those who are to be impacted by the initiative.  There is 
critical relevance of this suggestion to the local HLS managers who have been 
interviewed for this study.   
5. Conceptual Model V 
Siemieniuch and Sinclair offer a framework for what they term “knowledge 
lifecycle management,” which they entitled CLEVER.42  In a manufacturing 
environment, the authors studied methodologies for the dissemination of knowledge 
across functional boundaries and multiple project management.   Their goal was to design 
a strategy that would be effective in addressing internal KM needs and those needs that 
surpass organizational boundaries.  Here, the authors indicate that many companies had 
been successful with their implementation of pieces of KM projects.  The CLEVER 
project was intended to offer a framework that would be effective in varying sectors, by a  
 
40 Montano, B.  
41 Davis, C. (2004). A roadmap for long-term knowledge management success. AIIM E-doc Magazine, 
36-38 
42 Siemmieniuch, C. and Sinclair, M. (2004).  CLEVER: a process framework for knowledge lifecycle 
management.  International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 24:11, p. 1105 
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range of businesses, across organizational boundaries.  Furthermore, the authors indicated 
that knowledge has a lifecycle that starts with creation and ends with retirement, rather 
than death.   
Perhaps the most promising component of the CLEVER project is the drive to 
develop a KM solution that has practical application.  “…while many frameworks are an 
academic’s delight…they are of little benefit to society unless they are usable by people 
in organizations faced with knowledge problems.”43  The study highlights the critical 
importance of process utility by those who likely need but might not understand KM.  
Furthermore, the CLEVER framework focused upon the inter-organizational and cultural 
impact that an effective process would require, as opposed to developing strategies 
associated with cultivating, mining, storing and other processes associated with IT.  The 
authors continually monitored developments in the field of KM as they engaged an 
understanding of the real state of KM within the organizations and industries they were 
focused upon.  They engaged an iterative, user-based model that was subject to 
continuous input from end-users, conducted one-day workshops for evaluative purposes 
and then used technological options to disseminate the end product. 
Generally, the CLEVER model is based upon six general processes or 
characteristics.  The model stresses that learning becomes a continual process engaged 
within a flexible environment, where bureaucratic hurdles are reduced to a minimum.  
Like Liebowitz, they stress the need for a blame-free culture where experimentation is 
encouraged and failure is expected and its effects are minimized by a team-based 
approach that is characterized by shared vision.  In this environment, the creation and 
transfer of knowledge occurs as a cultural process and serves to enhance continued 
development of new products along with iterative improvement of organizational 
processes.  Unfortunately, the authors also stress the need to apportion staff resources to 
the KM process; however, they recognize the current tendency in many organizations to 
be “anorexic rather than lean, and in such a context there are always many other tasks for 
people to do…”44   
 
43 Siemmieniuch, C. and Sinclair, M., p. 1105 
44 Ibid., p. 1110 
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These conceptual models are offered for discussion and as a framework for a KM 
response to the challenges of local HLS management. Unfortunately, many of the models 
are conceived, introduced and discussed in a strictly academic, theoretical context.  This 
paper attempts to isolate some opportunities and contexts for real-world, practical 
applications, within the context of public organizational entities.  None of these 
conceptual models represents a plug-in solution within the context of this paper.  Each of 
the models offers components that appear to meet the most pressing needs for the 
challenges relevant to HLS management.  Further discussion of the more practical 
components of these models, specifically as they are embodied in recommendations, can 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is intended to at least begin to identify a process that can be initiated 
and institutionalized within, and between, local-level law enforcement agencies.  The 
process is intended to enable these organizations to identify, collect, and manage 
knowledge relevant to homeland security, and then use that knowledge effectively in the 
continuing development of the HLS management field.  If successful, the process will 
create and engage organizational, cultural and technological procedures that permit the 
continuing generation capture, archiving and actualizing of information relevant to the 
HLS management function.  Ideally, the identified outcome will be repeatable and will 
enable local law enforcement agencies to address some of the challenges associated with 
the loss of HLS expertise in the short term, and then build into agency processes the 
mechanism for the capture and efficient activation of relevant homeland security 
knowledge over the longer term.   
For purposes of this thesis, six local agency representatives were provided with an 
overview of this study proposal.  Agency executives were selected for this study via three 
methods.  Two agency executives were identified by their respective Chiefs of Police.  
Two agency representatives were identified as positional peers by the representatives that 
had been selected by the Chiefs.  Two agency representatives were identified 
independently by the author, and one of those representatives declined the invitation to 
participate.   
Each of the participating executives agreed to be interviewed on tape; however, 
most of the participants asked that they not be identified by name. The participating 
executives submitted to a semi-structured interview that was designed to ascertain a 
variety of information; however, the tone and method was decidedly conversational, with 
a consistent list of questions asked of the participants.  The executives were asked about 
their own work and education history, characteristics of their communities (crime 
concerns,   agency   size   and   structure,   geographical   issues   and   socio   economics,  
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population, etc.)  These subject-matter experts were also asked to describe the nature of 
HLS management within their agency, and they were asked to identify major knowledge 
areas and skills that were required for their work.    
The intent of the interviews was to capture practitioner perceptions on 
information relevant to certain KM premises espoused in the literature, while also 
permitting the identification of information that might prove either consistently 
applicable to all of the executives or unique and specific to the individual subject’s 
environment.  The following chapter provides an overview of each interview.  Included 
in the overview is a description of the jurisdiction’s major geographic and demographic 
characteristics, a description of the participant’s rank and responsibilities, and the 
participant’s description of the major HLS challenges currently faced by the represented 
jurisdiction.  The information that is collected will be analyzed using the contextual 
frameworks and definitions offered in Chapter II.   
Interviews were initially conducted in the Fall of 2004.  After the completion of 
the interviews, the major portions of this thesis were compiled.  Chapters IV and V were 
electronically transmitted to each of the participants during the Spring of 2005.  The 
participants were then invited to offer feedback on the practicality and effectiveness of 
each recommendation.  That feedback is reflected in the Validation section of Chapter III 
and is incorporated into the Recommendations section of Chapter V.  The contextual 
frameworks and definitions offered in Chapter II will also provide structure to the 
recommendations offered in Chapter V. 
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IV. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
A. RESULTS 
The following chapter reports results, findings and validation obtained from 
interviews and follow-up contact with a narrow sample of individual HLS practitioners in 
the NCR.  These practitioners are law enforcement officers of varying ranks, 
backgrounds and levels of experience.  At the time of each interview, the participants 
bore either primary or significant responsibility for the HLS function within their 
assigned agencies.  As indicated in Chapter III, the participants were deemed appropriate 
for the study by virtue of their position, and were selected using varying methodologies 
(see Chapter III), including mere willingness to participate.    
1. Interview Subject 1 
Subject 1 holds the rank of Captain in a suburban Maryland police agency.45  The 
agency is staffed by 1420 sworn members and 255 non-sworn personnel.46  The agency is 
the primary law enforcement service provider for the county, which has a population of 
816,791 residents (2001 census) and covers 485 square miles.47  The jurisdiction is 
defined geographically by a shared border with Washington D.C., and is characterized 
primarily as residential; however, there are large pockets of industrial and retail 
establishments throughout the county.  The jurisdiction is only minimally characterized 
by agricultural interests.  The police budget is over 153 million dollars.  In the past year, 
the jurisdiction has experienced a spike in both violent crime and some non-violent 
crimes, specifically auto theft.  The jurisdiction currently experiences the second highest 
number of murders of any jurisdiction in the state, and reported rape is currently thirty 
percent higher than last year. 
Subject 1 has been a police officer (with additional experience in one other law 
enforcement agency) for twenty years, and is eligible to retire within five years.  Subject 
1 holds a bachelors degree and a Master of Science.  His current title is Director, Office 
of Intelligence and Protective Services and he indicated that the office was created after 
 
45 Interview with Subject 1, November 19, 2004 
46 Prince Georges County Police, 2003 Annual Report to the Community   
47 http://co.pg.md.us [last accessed June 25, 2005] 
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September 11, 2001 by shifting departmental resources to address emerging HLS 
concerns.  Subject 1 has experience that primarily reflects a patrol orientation with an 
emphasis upon activities associated with community policing and administration, unlike 
the other subjects interviewed for this work, who indicated overwhelmingly a substantial 
background in special events, tactical and emergency management.    
Subject 1 has current responsibility for security-related duties (including locations 
and people), and information and resource management.  All department personnel 
involved in HLS and intelligence functions report directly to Subject 1.  In August of 
2004, a re-organization resulted in the movement of the department’s crime analysis 
function under the command of Subject 1, who characterizes the proliferation of criminal 
gangs as the most pressing current threat to community safety.     
Subject 1 identified major knowledge areas relevant to his position, which he 
further categorized as “soft skills and hard skills.”48  KM literature would appear to 
reflect these categories as tacit and explicit knowledge areas, respectively.49  Areas of 
explicit or “hard skills” include grants management, intelligence management, and 
emergency management and training.   The grants management function reflects a critical 
funding source for the department’s HLS activities.  This activity requires a very high 
degree of specialized knowledge, and used to be centralized prior to the dissolution and 
decentralization of the function.  Areas of expertise required for this responsibility 
include the identification of relevant grant opportunities, the completion of grant 
applications, and the continuing management of funded grants.  The Intelligence 
Management function includes the supervision of personnel assigned to both criminal and 
HLS intelligence functions, along with supervision and management of all internal 
intelligence-related databases.  Emergency Management includes all coordinated 
response activities surrounding any activation of the county’s Emergency Management 
Operations Center (EMOC).  The EMOC is activated during periods of heightened need 
for public services (such as weather-related emergencies) or other unforeseen, unplanned 
emergencies like hazardous materials incidents, major traffic events, or other natural-
disaster or large-scale criminal events.  The training responsibility was characterized 
 
48 Interview with Subject 1 
49 Rumizen, M. 
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basically as the creation and engagement of table-top exercises.  All of the activities 
associated with the ”hard skills” were described as more rigorous, with policies and 
procedures attached that are designed to incorporate accountability and streamline 
resource flow and decision making.  
Soft skills, or those areas of knowledge that are much more difficult to identify, 
quantify and/or capture include categories identified by Subject 1 as politics, 
collaboration and relationship skills.    These “soft skills” also appear to lack specific 
procedures and boundaries, but appear no less critical to HLS than the hard skills 
identified by Subject 1.  In response to the 9-11 Commission report, for instance, Subject 
1 stated that the police department required a vastly improved relationship with its 
department of Fire Rescue and Emergency Medical Services.  Political dexterity, defined 
loosely as the ability to maneuver effectively in a highly competitive, politically charged 
environment, is very important to Subject 1 due to the overlap in emergency functions of 
different county agencies, including police, fire, public works and public health.  Subject 
1 indicated that many of the county agencies were maneuvering for increased eligibility 
for HLS-related funding that had been made available to many jurisdictions by The 
United States Department of Homeland Security, especially under the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI).  Subject 1 described a politically charged external 
environment fueled by a perception that the police “and fire are getting all of the good 
stuff,”50 and characterized the involvement of the county’s public health entity in HLS as 
very limited, but potentially increasing.  Subject 1 also indicated that the police 
department had little or no contact with any of these entities prior to the attacks of 9-11. 
Public expectations that were forged in the aftermath of these attacks have driven the 
need to begin to positively shape this relationship, which is now characterized by 
competition for funding.    
Subject 1 stated that, due to the increasing focus on competing goals (specifically, 
the need to work cooperatively with agencies that are in competition for resources) the 
knowledge of how to craft meaningful professional relationships (which primarily 
requires communication skills), while developing and maintaining a big-picture focus, is 
 
50 Interview with Subject 1  
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critical in the HLS framework for his jurisdiction.  With regard to knowledge transfer, 
Subject 1 indicated that his department is increasingly focused on documentation of 
initiatives, efforts towards those initiatives and outcomes.  Documentation occurs in the 
form of spreadsheets that are made available to all members of the crime analysis unit or 
other interested parties, sometimes as needed and sometimes on a need-to-know basis. 
2. Interview Subject 2 
Subject 2 holds the rank of Lieutenant in a suburban Maryland jurisdiction that is 
geographically characterized as the mid-point between Washington D.C. and the city of 
Baltimore, which is the largest city in Maryland.51  This jurisdiction is immediately 
adjacent to the MWCOG region.  The five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77 are 
known to have used lodging facilities in the county (Laurel, Md.) before re-locating to 
Herndon, Virginia.52  The agency is staffed by 358 sworn officers and 181 non-sworn 
personnel.53  The agency is the primary law enforcement service provider for the county, 
which has a population of 265,935 residents and covers 251 square miles.  The 
jurisdiction is primarily residential in nature, due to strict growth and land-use 
restrictions.  Of all the jurisdictions studied for this work, the county is home to the most 
agricultural and least industrial or commercial land use. The annual budget for the county 
is approximately $564 million, with over $52 million dedicated to police operations.  The 
jurisdiction has experienced a general decrease in both serious and less-serious crime.  
Subject 2 indicated that gang-related crime is the most pressing concern currently.54
Subject 2 has 16 years of police experience, all with his current agency, and he is 
eligible for retirement within four years. He has experience in patrol, Special Weapons 
and Tactics (SWAT) and communications.  He estimated that any person who moved into 
his current position would face a learning curve of up to two years.  He stated that the 
landscape is changing so rapidly with regard to HLS management, that his position 
responsibilities are nebulous and similarly evolving.    
 
51 Interview with Subject 2, December 17, 2004 
52 The 9/11 Commission Report 
53 Howard County Department of Police, Annual Report, 2003 
54 Ibid. 
 25
                                                
Subject 2 is currently the department’s director for the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness, a job title and unit created after the 9-11 attacks.  The job description is 
evolving and presently includes supervision of a staff of two full-time and one part-time 
personnel.  The two full-time members are permanently detailed to out-of-office 
responsibilities including the Maryland Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the 
Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC).   Responsibilities for this position 
include grants management, emergency management, procurement, community outreach 
and information sharing and training (which involves the design and execution of field 
training exercises).  With regard to the latter, Subject 2 stated that he has a security 
clearance from the FBI, but is not well versed in intelligence matters.  Subject 2 
identified the most critical skill related to his position as communication, specifically, the 
ability to communicate verbally.  He described “knowing who to call” for assistance as a 
vital component of his work.  He also listed the ability to recognize and negotiate the 
evolving intra-jurisdictional competition for resources, without generating enemies, as a 
critical skill relevant to his position. 
Subject 2 generally acknowledged that duplication of effort is a fact of life for the 
local agencies represented in this study.  In describing his own agency’s approach to HLS 
management, he indicated that he felt an appropriate level of internal priority has been 
set, but that each local agency likely has different approach to the task.  
3. Interview Subject 3 
Subject 3 holds the rank of Lieutenant in a suburban Maryland jurisdiction that is 
geographically defined by a shared border with Washington D.C.55 One of the September 
11 hijackers is know to have landed a practice flight from New Jersey at a private airpark 
in this jurisdiction.56   
The agency is staffed by 1140 sworn officers and 332 non-sworn personnel.  The 
agency is the primary law enforcement service provider for the county, which has a 
population of 938,000 residents and covers 537 square miles.  The jurisdiction is 
primarily suburban/residential in nature, with limited agricultural interests and a 
 
55 Interview with Subject 3, October 22, 2004 
56 “…on July 20, Hanjour…rented a plane from Caldwell and took a practice flight from Fairfield to 
Gaithershburg, Maryland, a route that would have allowed them to fly near Washington, D.C.”   The 9/11 
Commission Report, p. 242 
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substantial business community as well.  The annual budget for the department is in 
excess of $150 million.57  The jurisdiction has experienced a general reduction in violent 
crime, with some increases in non-violent crime, including fraud and theft.58  
Subject 3 has twenty-seven years police experience, all with his current agency, 
and he is currently eligible for retirement. He holds a B.S in criminal justice.  At the time 
of this interview, Subject 3 was a deputy director of the department’s Special Operations 
Division (SOD).  He is currently assigned as the department’s representative to the 
County’s recently created, centralized Office of Homeland Security.  Subject 3 has 
experience in training, patrol, emergency response and management and traffic 
enforcement.  He has most recently engaged in significant training in the area of WMD 
and has been instrumental in standing up the department’s Special Events Response 
Team (SERT).  This unit is a fixed cadre of highly trained and specially equipped officers 
who can be detailed in advance or mobilized quickly for demonstrations, National 
Security Special Events, or other large scale events and emergencies. 
In assessing his value to the organization, Subject 3 stated that he is in a unique 
position due to his function as a major repository for HLS knowledge within his agency.  
In attempting to assess how the agency would function in his absence, he assessed that it 
would be a challenge because of the difficulties in identifying and capturing knowledge 
and capabilities unique to the individual (born of training and education), along with 
knowledge derived from personal experience.  Further, he indicated that, with regard to 
transfer of knowledge, the department has “no significant components on paper.”59  He 
also described a very dynamic environment, one where “there is no time to get your feet 
wet.  Things are changing so quickly and it is difficult to be proactive,” in a rapidly 
changing environment.60   
Subject 3 identified various categories of knowledge, critical to his position, that 
were similar to those identified by Subject 1.  Subject 3 identified equipment selection 
and management, budget, grant identification and management, WMD training and 
 
57 Montgomery County Department of Police, Annual Report, 2002-2003 
58 Montgomery County Department of Police, Crime Report, Year End 2004.  Internal report 
59 Interview with Subject 3 
60 Ibid. 
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response methodologies, collective bargaining provisions and personnel regulations as 
the major knowledge areas vital to his position.   Subject 3 also offered specific 
distinctions between what he described as “technical” knowledge versus what he 
identified as “process” knowledge, which he associated with political dexterity.  He 
generally indicated that to be successful, one may need to know the time, and yet not 
have the technical knowledge to build a watch.  Knowing what the watchmaker needs 
and facilitating the success of the watchmaker, for instance, can be a critical form of 
“process” knowledge.  Subject 3 offered WMD as an example, where he stated that he 
does not know how to clean a contaminated scene, but knows how to identify when a 
scene requires cleaning, and then understands how to manage the process toward a 
successful outcome. 
Subject 3 offered brief descriptions of most of the knowledge areas and relevant 
skills itemized above.  His descriptions were consistent with knowledge areas that are 
best described as tacit, as they are heavily guided by standard operating procedures and 
fairly rigid procedural guidelines.61    Subject 3 also spent a great deal of time during the 
interview discussing the impact of politics upon decision making.  In an interesting and 
consistent dichotomy, he indicated that a cooperative working relationship with Fire 
Rescue was critical and that the relationship has evolved substantially since the terror 
attacks, but that the police and Fire Rescue are competing for the same pool of available 
resources.  He stressed that being uniform and compatible in terms of response was 
critical for public safety, yet he stated, “Operational decisions are made based on 
financial benefit.  There are different objectives” for each and, fundamentally, the 
outcome is driven by the desire to get more resources and have more power within the 
emergency planning and response environment.   
Subject 3 stated that the availability of federal funding for homeland defense 
needs has turned traditional ‘budgeting’ equations around.  He indicated that, 
traditionally, decision makers used the budget planning process to identify organizational 
needs and then attempted to secure political support for funding those needs.  The new 
paradigm requires the creation of needs to fit the identified eligibility for funding and 
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stresses the documentation of emphasis on outcomes, rather than the actual outcome.  
The availability of funding, he indicated, now more consistently drives previously 
unidentified operational needs or drives identified, lower-priority needs to an artificially 
higher level of priority.   
Prior to late 2004, there had been no additional police positions dedicated to the 
work associated with HLS management, and his current position was generated by 
shifting resources as opposed to receiving additional assets.   
4.  Interview Subject 4 
Subject 4 holds the rank of Captain in a suburban Virginia jurisdiction that is 
geographically characterized by a shared, natural border with Washington D.C.62 
Coincidentally, the jurisdiction also borders Arlington, and provided mutual aid on 
September 11, 2001.  The agency is staffed by 1852 sworn officers and 1309 non-sworn 
personnel.  The agency is the primary law enforcement service provider for the county, 
which has a population of over 986,000 residents and covers 399 square miles.  The 
jurisdiction is very similar to the jurisdiction represented by Subject 3.  It is primarily 
suburban/residential in nature.  The annual budget for the department is $187 million.  
The jurisdiction has experienced an overall decline in the rate of serious crime, with the 
exception of aggravated assault.63
Subject 4 has 19 years of police experience, all with her current agency, and is 
eligible for retirement within five years.  Her experience is based in K9, Special Weapons 
and Tactics (SWAT), Civil Disturbance management, Explosives Ordinance, WMD, 
Marine Patrol and underwater search and rescue (SAR).  At the time of this interview, 
Subject 4 was the director of the department’s Special Operations Division; however, she 
is currently a district commander.  Subject 4 stated that many new challenges and 
demands have arisen since the attacks of September 11 and that the fundamental nature of 
her responsibilities has changed dramatically since that time.  Subject 4 stated that many 
of the  needs dictated  by  the new environment  have fallen to her,  and to the units under  
 
62 Interview with Subject 4, December 2, 2004 
63 Fairfax County Police Department, Annual Report, 2004 
 29
                                                
her command, by default.  She indicated that the department has not created additional 
capacity but has increased training and modified existing jobs and components to absorb 
the new work associated with HLS management.   
Subject 4 articulated (as did 4 of the 5 executives interviewed) that, given the vast 
and technically complex training she has received and experience she has garnered, it 
would be very difficult for the department to replace her should she die, retire or 
otherwise choose to leave.  Subject 4 estimated that her replacement would require a 
minimum of a two-year learning curve; however, she indicated that “if nothing happens, 
there is no cost” for that curve.   Subject 4 indicated that she also holds the responsibility 
for and knowledge relevant to intelligence, grants management and training.  She stated 
that staying current on the areas of demand for training (in varied and technically 
complex fields) was drawing increasing levels of attention and that this demand was 
“heaped on” to her established workload.  Organizationally, Subject 4 indicated that she 
believes, based upon her experience, that there has not been a high premium placed upon 
the knowledge relevant to HLS management.  She stated, “They don’t think knowledge is 
that important.”  Structurally, Subject 4 indicated that the organization would soon be 
required to implement reasonable measures to ensure knowledge continuity, since many 
of the supervisors and practitioners in highly technical areas, like explosives ordinance, 
for example, are currently eligible for retirement, yet it takes at least two years to train a 
technician.  Subject 4 stated that this type of challenge permeates the most highly 
specialized functions relevant to the department’s HLS management.   
5. Interview Subject 5 
Subject 5 holds the rank of commander in an urban jurisdiction within the NCR.64 
The agency is staffed by 3800 sworn officers and 800 non-sworn personnel.65  The 
agency is the primary law enforcement service provider for the city, which has a 
 
64 Interview with Subject 5, January 20, 2005. 
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population of 572,000 residents and covers 68 square miles.66  The annual budget for the 
department is $377 million.67
Subject 5 has thirteen years police experience, all in her current agency.  She 
holds a B.A and a M.A, and is currently pursuing a M.S.  Subject 5 is the only executive 
interviewed for this study who will not become eligible for retirement within five years.  
Her experience is based in patrol, supervision, and operations management and her 
current job title is Commander, Special Operations Division; the command houses the 
department’s Special Operations, Special Events Management, and HLS/Counter 
Terrorism functions.  Three years ago, the HLS function was added to the Special 
Operations’ command; however, aside from two additional bomb technicians, no 
additional staff has been added.  
Subject 5 identified areas of knowledge critical to the department’s HLS 
management that are generally consistent with those identified by the other managers 
interviewed for this work.  Specifically, she cited emergency response, intelligence, 
training and Explosives Ordinance as major areas of knowledge.  She cited 
communication and political dexterity as important skills.  Subject 5 indicated that the 
most significant short-term, operational challenge that her organization faces is the 
perishable nature of critical knowledge.  Subject 5 described an environment where 
people obtain training and education in order to become a recognized expert in a 
particular field.  Once recognized, these personnel routinely fail to remain current on that 
expertise, instead allowing it to become stale, outdated or obsolete, yet the department 
continues to recognize their expertise and rely upon their knowledge.    
Subject 5 cited as an immediate, yet secondary, challenge the need for succession 
planning within her department.  By way of example, she indicated that seven of eleven 
bomb technicians have been eligible for retirement for over five years, and any of these 
individuals could retire upon short notice and with drastic effect.  In order to manage this 
potential exodus, Subject 5 has prioritized the need for cross training, whereby K9 
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handlers, trained in explosives detection, also become trained as explosives technicians.  
This trend toward the centralization of highly technical areas of responsibilities is a short-
term fix for a significant problem related to knowledge exodus. It also is a solution that 
perpetuates the dynamic of adding work without increasing capacity.   Subject 5 stated 
that she does not believe her organization prioritizes the need to develop knowledge 
relevant to HLS.    She also indicated concern for the vulnerability generated by the lack 
of knowledge-transfer mechanisms within her agency.  In the dynamic area of HLS, 
Subject 5 stated that policy development and procedural institutionalization has not kept 
up with knowledge development.     
B.  FINDINGS 
While the interviews offered a variety of interesting revelations, this chapter 
focuses on the areas where the interview subjects indicated a great deal of convergence or 
similarity in their methods and concerns.  The concerns included succession planning, 
institutional memory, knowledge systems and the general identification of parameters.  It 
appears that certain consistent generalizations can also be made regarding the state of 
HLS KM for local police in the NCR.  First, just as there is no single accepted definition 
for KM, there appears to be no single definition for HLS.  In fact, if information is 
considered to be a storable, retrievable, transmittable component of knowledge, then the 
interviewed practitioners fairly indicate that the ability to derive HLS knowledge is not 
universally apparent.  There is little standardization surrounding how knowledge is 
generated and transferred, thereby raising the question as to whether there in fact exists a 
consistent level of knowledge about HLS.  Rather, it appears to be a field with a growing 
body of information, and a great need for knowledge development, management and 
transfer.   
A second significant finding indicates that while new demands have arisen and a 
great deal of new knowledge has been generated in order to meet those demands during 
the last three to five years, the affected organizations have not added capacity to address 
those demands.  While new knowledge has been created, there have been few additions 
of relevant positions and personnel.  The new knowledge is thus imbedded within 
existing components of the organization.  These  components have modified their mission  
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to adapt to the new demands; however, little of the existing work was off-loaded to make 
room for these demands.  Thus, the creation of this new body of knowledge relevant to 
HLS appears to have occurred in a zero-sum environment.   
Third, the knowledge described above appears to be tacit in nature.  It resides in 
people’s heads and very few formal procedures, those intended to capture that knowledge 
for later organizational use, exist or are being considered. With regard to knowledge 
flow, HLS knowledge appears mired in the socialization phase, where it is flowing in a 
rather unstructured way at an unpredictable rate from individuals to groups.  This 
knowledge has yet to be subject to a formalization process that will enable its evolution 
from tacit to explicit; however, there are indications of an emerging trend toward 
formalization.68  In organizations that tend to be heavy on policies and procedures, this 
presents a unique risk.  As local police organizations attempt to engage the 
externalization and combination phases of knowledge flow, they risk losing the 
knowledge that is embodied in those persons in key positions.  As the interviews indicate, 
the majority of these individuals will leave the organization sooner than the organization 
may be able to effectively engage these evolutionary stages. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it is clear that there is, among the HLS 
experts, an extreme duplication of effort necessitated by the lack of a centralized 
repository that enables interaction among the members of this currently invisible but 
potentially vibrant community of practice.  The interviews revealed, along with the 
overlap of knowledge areas, that many of the experts are working on similar outcomes, at 
the same time, within organizationally imposed vacuums.  None of the participants 
indicated that they engaged consistently in structured interaction with others in their 
fields, and none of the participants indicated that they routinely participate in virtual 
interaction relevant to the practice of HLS management.  Also very significant are the 
wide-ranging perceptions of knowledge relevant to HLS and the lack of consistency 
among the departments’ structures, applications and organizational value placed upon 
HLS management.  None of the subjects indicated that they had available to them all of 
the resources needed to fully execute their responsibilities. 
 
68 Nissen, M. (2002).  An extended model of knowledge flow dynamics. Communication of the 
Association for Information Systems, Vol. 8, 251-266 
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Some significant but less critical findings also emerged. Primarily, it appears that 
only one of the interviewed managers has command of the intelligence function.   If, as 
some experts suggest, the future of HLS is in prevention, then it appears clear that the 
local agencies in the NCR have a need for an adjusted perspective.  Additionally, all but 
one of the HLS managers were primarily oriented around response and recovery, yet only 
one of the managers cited as a critical knowledge area the understanding of the 
intelligence function as it relates to terrorism and the HLS function.  
Generally, these findings appear significant on both the individual and 
organizational level.  The following chapter outlines a suggested framework that is 
intended to offer a practical, low-cost method to immediately address these findings. 
C. VALIDATION   
Each participant in this study was offered an electronic copy of Chapters IV and 
V of this thesis.  At the time of each interview, and again after providing chapter drafts, 
each participant was offered the opportunity to review the substance of the interview 
summaries offered in Chapter III, and to offer comment regarding the recommendations 
in Chapter IV.  Unfortunately, and in spite of repeated requests from the author, only 
three of the participants provided feedback for inclusion in this section.  All of these 
subjects indicated that the interviews were represented accurately, and the author is 
confident that any additional input received after the submission of this work will reflect 
the remaining two interviews as favorably reviewed and accurately represented.   
1. Subject 2 Validation 
Subject 2 confirmed the interview summary as accurate and offered that the 
recommendations appear practical and useful.69 Subject 2, however, expressed 
apprehension that the political climate within the NCR would not support the 
recommendations.  He articulated his belief that political pressures force agencies to 
effectively support a culture where they protect and horde, versus share and cultivate, 
information and sources of information.  He indicated his belief that, while there is an 
underlying desire among the lower ranks to share information, the actual process of 
sharing is not organizationally supported by higher-ranking members of the involved 
agencies.   
 
69 Personal Communication with Subject 3, June 15, 2005 
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2. Subject 5 Validation 
Subject 5 also reviewed the information and confirmed the interview summary as 
accurate.70  This subject similarly indicated that the recommendations proffered within 
this thesis are valid; however, Subject 5 reiterated skepticism regarding the acceptance of 
HLS as an organizational priority and again stated that her organization continues to 
espouse support for the HLS mission but, operationally, appears to support a somewhat 
different philosophy, akin to head-in-the-sand.  Subject 5 also repeated some frustration 
at the perceived lack of organizational support for the priorities of HLS. 
3.  Subject 3 Validation 
Subject 3 offered the most substantive input for inclusion in this section.71  
Generally, Subject 3 indicated that all of the involved executives face similar challenges 
and mutual concerns that could be fairly addressed, at least initially, through increased 
opportunities for structured collaboration and communication.  Subject 3 broke down his 
input into three major sections, including general workload, documentation and increased 
focus on prevention and the role of intelligence in prevention.   
With regard to staffing, Subject 3 underscored one of the findings of this work.  
Subject 3 affirmed that the executives involved in this study are responsible for the 
additional duties associated with HLS, and yet have received no additional staff resources 
to assist with meeting the demands of the increased workload.  He stated that their role as 
de facto Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) has resulted in greater demands to provide 
training, which is a very time-consuming duty.  Prior to September 11, the demand for 
the provision of training was not nearly as great as the current demand.  This investment 
creates a ripple effect in other areas, where the workload has also increased significantly.   
Specifically, Subject 3 indicated that there is far more paperwork to complete and that 
most of the paperwork, associated with grants, is detailed, tedious, voluminous and 
extremely time intensive.  There is also paperwork in new areas, where the SMEs lack a 
historical reference.   
 
 
70 Personal Communication with Subject 5, June 24, 2005 
71 Personal Communication with Subject 3, July 12, 2005 
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Subject 3 also highlighted the difficulty of challenges associated with “legal, labor 
and financial concerns” that either did not exist, or were not apparent, prior to September 
11, 2001.72  He offered OSHA fit testing as an example, where union regulations prohibit 
the gathering and storing of information deemed mandatory by the funding authority.   
Finally, Subject 3 indicated that it is appropriate to be concerned by the diminished role 
of intelligence and the lack of focus upon prevention.  Subject 3 fairly highlighted the 
efficiencies that could be achieved through additional focus on prevention through 
heightened intelligence sharing and collaboration; however, he indicated that current 
funding streams emphasize equipment that enables response and recovery activities.  This 
conclusion appears to underscore the emphasis of outcomes driven by funding 
opportunities.  
 















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 37
                                                
V. DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, VALIDATION 
A. DISCUSSION 
The general findings appear to indicate support for the introduction of KM 
principles to the challenges of HLS management in the NCR.  In applying KM principles 
to local HLS, there is no time more opportune than a point early in the development cycle 
in order to reap positive benefits. It is at this preliminary stage that the foundation for the 
organization’s work, needs and goals within new knowledge areas is formulated.  It is 
also at this point where the greatest opportunity to quickly ingrain KM principles exists.  
Once the goals are formalized, a “rush to the finish line” often follows, and this push 
frequently compromises KM program alignment with the general needs and goals of the 
organization.  Rumizen (2002) advocates a tortoise vs. hare perspective, whereby 
organizations engage in a “gestational phase of discovery and exploration” that cannot 
and should not be rushed.73  A rushed response might generate ill-defined or ill-fitting 
goals, poor planning and execution, inadequate support and no goal attainment.  As the 
findings indicate, HLS is already rather nebulous and thus requires a thoughtful plan of 
implementation. 
1. Framework for KM Action 
Rowley offers generally a five-step plan for organizational action around a KM 
framework.74  These steps include identification of objectives, narrowing of focus, 
honing the scope and type of effort, delineation of technologies and techniques, and 
clarification of support roles.  This process of identifying objectives as a first step has 
been readily established as strategic organizational exercise.  With regard to KM in local 
police agencies, three central areas require attention. Again, strategically it is important 
for organizational members and leaders to accept the breadth and depth of how much 
they do not know what they don’t know.75  Accordingly, these agencies must first 
develop  mechanisms that will  enable the itemization and leveraging  of tacit knowledge,  
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which can then be effectively embedded, over time, in organizational processes.  The 
near-term leveraging will then enable the intermediate retention of knowledge within the 
organization as the human capital crisis unfolds.   
The second critical step for KM applications involves developing a project-focus 
approach.  Indeed, part of the ingrained organizational process needs to be a continual 
review of what was driving the original goal.  Injecting a KM perspective can thus enable 
managers to determine whether KM is appropriate at a project level or whether it is to be 
more organizationally ingrained.  In advocating the introduction of a HLS KM process, it 
would appear reasonable to expect local agencies to crawl, then to walk.  Accordingly, 
the orientation at the local level might best be toward the project, at least initially. This 
introductory process (which effectively represents the first step in planning for change), 
and the decisions that result from it, can cause pain, but the authority to initiate these 
reviews must be secured early and maintained consistently.76  Since the interviews that 
were completed for this work serve to illustrate that the landscape associated with HLS 
knowledge development is both emergent and dynamic, this type of flexibility might be 
important to maintain.   
The next step regards a delineation of the scope and type of relevant projects and 
measures that the agencies must engage in to both evaluate progress and ensure that the 
right work is getting done. This third and critical component of the KM framework 
involves selecting the appropriate criteria by which to evaluate success.  As HLS appears 
to represent a continuing process, the selection of criteria for evaluation may vary from 
standard and accepted measures like schedule and budget.  Davis (2004) cautions that 
successful KM is not a “sprint to the finish” as much as it represents a “stroll through the 
woods”.77 While engaged in the sprint, it is tempting to invoke the more traditional 
benchmarks, which fail to offer analysis on the real value (or lack thereof) of the 
initiative.  The critical nature of the HLS mission apparently invites a need for speed; 
however, a slower pace allows for the analysis of factors that are actively influencing the 
initiative and that might be less apparent when examined hurriedly.  It is, in fact, a 
combination of “methods and measures” that offer the best evaluation of value added by 
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the KM initiative.78 For local agencies, these evaluations may involve elementary 
assessments of completion, successful goal attainment and lack of duplicate efforts 
between agencies.   
After selecting criteria, technologies and techniques that can be utilized to support 
the implementation of KM, appropriate projects must then be identified.  This process 
also involves management of the marriage between programs and technologies.  
Additionally, as the CLEVER project indicated, it is important that KM processes be 
practical and that they be embedded in work and not perceived as extra work, just as KM 
processes must be embedded in organizations and not merely added on to the 
organizational chart.  Since the findings represented here indicate that, for many 
agencies, HLS currently represents added work, there has to be a process developed for 
sharing knowledge, strategies and operational commonalities. Then, as this study 
attempts to illustrate, technologies and techniques that can be utilized to support the 
implementation of KM projects must be identified and utilized. “Technology, experts 
agree, should be streamlined enough to integrate into a company’s operations, and it must 
be appropriate to the task.”79  
The final, and perhaps most critical, step in a successful knowledge management 
action plan regards the definition or roles for organizational members and maintenance of 
ownership that will engage with outcomes.  Given the lack of consistency of job 
descriptions and organizational support levels for local-agency HLS activities, this 
appears to be an area that requires immediate action in the NCR-represented agencies. 
Critical among these roles is that of the leadership.  Without fundamental support from 
the involved chiefs of police, therefore, KM is just dead in the water.  The leadership 
component must wield influence and should also have a tangible stake in, and 
accountability for, the final outcome.  The more influence, the greater the likelihood of 
success.  “In every successful knowledge management effort…an important senior 
sponsor or sponsor group pushed for the initiative.”80  Many KM experts feel that the role 
of the spirited evangelist or early adapter is critical to the success of any KM initiative, 
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and such an evangelist is currently lacking in the local context.81   Once the leadership is 
on board, further role assignments designed to support the initiative can and must be 
made. It is critical that the local-level police managers that are responsible for HLS, along 
with other informal organizational leaders, be tapped to act as ambassadors for KM 
projects and initiatives. While benefits and challenges of compiling cross-disciplinary 
teams and communities of practice have yet to be outlined, consistent managerial 
commitment, oversight and sponsorship of HLS KM initiatives do not appear to currently 
exist.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
This study is intended to offer an overview of the problem of HLS KM as it exists 
within an environment that has been defined in a purposefully narrow manner, given the 
limited nature of the research.  The recommendations that follow are admittedly basic.  
They are based upon an assessment of the HLS environment in the NCR, and upon the 
very basic tenets of KM.  Furthermore, these recommendations acknowledge that very 
limited resources are available at this stage in the development of HLS KM.  The 
recommendations that follow are classified according to the typology advocated by 
Liebowitz, which includes people (to include culture) processes and technology. 
Additionally, these recommendations, while basic, are intended to be effective.   
1. People 
a. Recommendation 1:  Engage All HLS Managers in a One-Half-
Day Retreat on the Need for and Benefits of KM 
In conceptual model IV, Davis discussed the importance of involving, 
during the earliest implementation phases, those impacted by KM efforts.  To that end, 
Koenig (2004) cites the often-overlooked need for the alteration of corporate culture in 
order to ensure that KM processes are seated well within the organization.82  This idea 
offers significant challenges for the HLS managers, since they represent different 
agencies, each with its own unique culture.  For purposes of this work, the managers are 
being asked to broaden their perspective on which culture requires adjustment, in that it is 
not so much the culture of each agency as it is that of the portion of the profession that 
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each manager represents.  Successful KM implementation must begin with support, 
education and training for users in order to offer any hope for successful implementation.  
KM, Koenig argues, is “more about people and corporate culture than it is about 
technology.”83  Koenig indicates that among the most prevalent reasons for the failure of 
KM systems implementation are inadequate user training, poor fit between the proposed 
system and the users work environment, and a failure of the user to recognize personal 
benefits.  For HLS managers, especially given the indication that HLS is added work, it is 
critical that they first understand the benefits of KM and the need for KM system 
implementation. For this reason, the primary recommendation involves at least a half-day 
overview of KM for HLS managers in the COG region.  For many of these managers, 
KM currently represents an unknown; however, when certain process suggestions are 
offered (like the need for continuity of knowledge), these managers might readily submit 
that the suggestions are valid.  These managers, as the CLEVER typology from 
conceptual model V indicated, must be offered the opportunity to reconcile the need for 
KM into the HLS environment, and they must be able to identify benefits for their 
organizations and communities.   
Bennet (2004) states that knowledge workers use their intellect, 
experience and training to handle the challenges and to solve the problems that their 
organizations face.84  HLS managers, then, are actually knowledge workers and they 
must, therefore, be informed and persuaded regarding the benefits of KM implementation 
first, before the introduction of an actual KM process or method.  These benefits are both 
short term, with regard to the manager’s individual search for information, and long term, 
with regard to infusing  the  organizational  processes with   the resulting  knowledge. If,   
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near adequately aware of the importance of training and user education, and the KPMG Consulting report 
illustrates and illuminates the problem in a wonderfully compelling fashion by, ironically enough, not 
recognizing it.” 
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as Srikantaiah (2004) states, KM is about connecting people for the purpose of sharing 
information, then those who are to be connected must want that connection and fully 
understand the potential benefits.85   
b. Recommendation 2:  Engage All HLS Managers in a Quarterly 
Gathering Designed to Facilitate the Sharing of Ideas and the 
Development of Relationships  
Each HLS manager would be encouraged to bring another, less senior, 
executive officer with an interest in HLS.     
Clearly, KM results when connections between people are made.  These 
connections are intended to facilitate the movement of knowledge between people via 
conversations, publications and databases, among other methodologies.86  KM results 
when the connections enable the methodologies to leverage experiences, information, 
concepts and best practices.  Given the extremely limited resources available, the lowest 
cost option is to offer these managers the opportunity to gather periodically to meet, face-
to-face, to discuss initiatives, opportunities and work outcomes.  These opportunities 
offer portholes in the silo walls, where officers of jurisdictions that are geographically 
side-by-side will get to peek, figuratively, at the work of the counterpart who wears a 
different uniform to work, but who might be dealing with identical problems.  This very 
basic option offers the opportunity to reduce local redundancies and increase the 
opportunities for convergence of effort and for synergy. 
There are real-world examples of successful KM applications, but these 
were not “light switch” applications.  The organizations that have successfully engaged 
KM have undergone cultural modification by tying compensation to the process of 
sharing knowledge.   Some   private-sector entities   have been successful by bringing 
together groups of eight to ten professionals with divergent areas of expertise, to tackle a 
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specific project or emerging problem.87  Once the problem is solved or the project is 
completed, the teams, known as PeopleWebs, are disbanded.88
People Webs offer organizations an opportunity to create previously 
unexploited relationships.  Quinn, et al, indicate that the ”power of such interconnections 
is so great that even a modest number of collaborating independent professionals can 
leverage knowledge capabilities by hundreds of times.”89 People Webs are akin to 
Communities of Practice (COP), and to be successful they must have reliable data and 
communication platforms.  The data platforms must provide COP members with access 
to the information that is needed for success and the communication platforms must offer 
both public and private venues.90  Communities of practice develop to identify solutions 
to the organization’s most pressing problems, and they can be “defined by disciplines, by 
problems or by situations,” although they are usually reserved for single-organization 
participation.91 Once the problem is solved, the community dissolves as part of a natural 
flow.  Not unlike communities within the social environment, communities disappear 
sometimes because they are no longer needed; however, they also evaporate due to lack 
of support or overt hostility.92  The community, once established, can be reinvigorated on 
new issues as needed or, as the CLEVER model theorizes, can and should be left intact, 
at the ready to deal with new problems.  Wenger also forcibly asserts that establishing 
viable communities of practice represents a cornerstone of KM.93  For HLS at the local 
level, organizational boundaries should not serve to constrict the construction of and 
participation in People Webs.94  From the interviews, it appears that it is not that the HLS 
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managers do not always know or understand what needs to be done to address these new 
and complex problems, nor do they have anywhere  in their own organizations to turn for 
assistance.  It is apparent that the police culture does not yet permit them the discretion to 
do what they need to do, nor does it offer them the option to seek assistance from those in 
similar positions.95   
2. Processes 
a. Recommendation 3:  Encourage the MWCOG Police Chiefs’ 
Committee to Review the Organizational Structure of HLS 
Management  
The MWCOG should immediately initiate a process for the development 
of standardization and best practices in HLS management.  It is accepted that each of the 
agencies represented in this study are funded, structured and staffed differently, yet they 
face similar challenges, especially with regard to HLS.  It is clear that on a variety of 
topics, these agencies have engaged in informal information sharing.  Unfortunately, 
while regional coordination of resources relevant to HLS, as demonstrated by the Urban 
Area Security Initiative fund distribution process, has been prevalent and expected, no 
similar approach has been rendered with regard to the problems and decisions relevant to 
HLS in the NCR.   At this point in the knowledge-development cycle, we are simply 
unable to look to one agency in the region as the standard bearer with regard to HLS.  
Given that all but one of the HLS managers interviewed for this survey are eligible to 
leave their agencies within three to five years, there is an immediate need to engage a 
process for the development of best practices.      
3. Technology 
a. Recommendation 4: Encourage MWCOG to Offer a Password-
Protected Bulletin Board and Chat Room for the HLS Managers 
to Engage in Continuing Conversation and Sharing   
To address communication needs, a single mode of communication 
designed to enhance the process of sharing ideas--an intranet, for example--could serve to 
enhance communication.  A secure extranet would also be appropriate for use by a select 
group of customers.  These and other common communication methods serve as 
knowledge-management standards and help involve users in KM processes.  This user-
level involvement is critical to the success of any KM initiative.  Linking these 
 
95 O’Toole, P.  (1995).  Leading Change.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass  
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components   to strategy  and   involving  middle   management   in  the   creation  of  the 
communication strategy are also key components of success.  Members could seek 
information on existing projects in other jurisdictions, and share information about 
ongoing initiatives in the member’s home jurisdiction. 
The conceptual models offered by Montano, and by Neville & Powell, 
serve to illustrate the importance of the interface between KM and IT.  If the HLS 
managers can accept that technology can assist in both growing knowledge and in the 
transfer of knowledge from the tacit to the explicit, then perhaps another solution is 
embodied in the appropriate technological and social tools.  Again, as previously 
indicated, there are limited resources available and thus there is a need to make KM part 
of the HLS management process, as opposed to creating additional work.  For these 
reasons more informal methodologies, those associated with low-to-no-cost, must be 
considered. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The interview subjects who responded to the request for validation (presented in 
Chapter IV) unanimously indicated that the recommendations offered in this study are 
practical, modest and, thus, achievable.  These recommendations, however, are by no 
means comprehensive.  There are additional recommendations and observations to be 
made that will require further research, effort and discussion.  The greatest area of 
concern revealed in this study is the inconsistency in priorities that has been 
demonstrated by all of the involved agencies.  Generally, each of these agencies receives 
significant funding for HLS-related activities and training, yet each lacks relevant and 
appropriate staff resources, formal policies and written plans to effectuate those activities.   
As Subject 4 indicated, it appears that all of the involved agencies ‘talk the talk’ and then 
proceed to lump the growing list of duties, expectations and responsibilities onto one or 
two people, who already had plenty of work to do.  Additionally, given that many of the 
experts are working simultaneously on similar projects, the mere introduction of a 
strategy for improved communication and collaboration could serve to generate at least a 
minimal level of efficiency.  Unfortunately, the forces of competition appear to be 
driving the involved agencies into a vacuum characterized by redundant effort, poor 
documentation, and a fingers-crossed, “it could never happen here,” operational 
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perspective.  Finally, as indicated in Chapter I, police agencies are notorious for poor 
training and succession planning.  Each agency is an individual entity, with different 
structure, philosophy, and expectations.  Generally, the strengths of these agencies would 
appear to lie in the ability to respond quickly to unfolding emergencies, as opposed to 
planning for the response to emergencies.  That is, the most important performance 
expectation is the ability to improvise, and the seat of the pants appears to represent a 
comfort zone with a strong gravitational pull that will only be broken by a concerted, 
meaningful effort. 





                                                
VI. CONCLUSION 
The recommendations that have been offered in this paper, though modest, are 
unique, specific and can be implemented in most organizations engaged in the HLS 
project, regardless of size or structure. From this starting point, however, a call to action 
can be formulated and a plan developed for additional work in this area.  Generally, these 
recommendations have been generated within an admittedly academic context, after 
consideration of a number of practical goals, similar to those envisioned during the 
CLEVER study (see Chapter II).  First, this study attempted to provide a description of 
the state of KM generally, and then a reality-based description of the state of KM for 
police in the NCR.  Second, the overarching goal of this study was to provide practical 
recommendations (within an environment that is both fiscally and culturally restrictive) 
to those within the police agencies represented so that they might at least begin to address 
specific KM problems.     
What proved most noteworthy throughout the interview process was the glaring 
lack of organizational focus on consistent information flow through the involved 
agencies, along with a consistent lack of formal mechanisms for capturing and regulating 
knowledge flow within these organizations.  Additionally, relevant to HLS, these 
organizations lacked consistent mechanisms to facilitate information flow to the public.  
The agency representatives all expressed concern about the continuity of knowledge flow 
within their agencies; however, none of those representatives mentioned explicitly any 
effort to ensure that HLS knowledge translated to a public venue.  It appears from this 
research, therefore, that the problem of knowledge flow in public agencies has two 
dimensions: internal and external.  Further, it appears that not one of the agencies is 
consistently engaged in activities designed to facilitate knowledge flow internally.  The 
agencies do not appear to be engaged, to any degree, in the development of external 
knowledge-flow capacity.96  
 
96 Nissen, M. 
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Paul (2003) asserts that it is difficult, even during the best of times, to get people 
in a high-performing agency to share what they know.97  When times are tough, as they 
are now in a time of national challenge, people tend to respond by hoarding knowledge 
and resources.  According to Subject 3, this very situation appears to have manifested in 
the NCR. For local HLS, the outcome of this dynamic could prove tragic, yet the 
complete lack of KM continues within the NCR.  In one recent incident, federal buildings 
were evacuated as an unidentified aircraft approached the restricted airspace surrounding 
the United States Capitol and the White House.  The emergency decision to evacuate was 
policy based and was communicated quickly to the affected workers, yet the leadership 
and government of Washington D.C. was not party to the decision process that led to the 
evacuation, nor was it informed of the decision.98  While the practical impact of the 
evacuation of thousands of workers onto city streets is not difficult to imagine, there is 
even more to be concerned with from a KM perspective.  Specifically, the agencies 
impacted by the evacuation decision had not ever shared between them the existence of 
the evacuation policy, which is currently under review. 
In order to more proactively address this type of real-world challenge, the affected 
police managers must first attempt to minimize competition for resources wherever 
practical, while they simultaneously maximize opportunities for collaborative 
relationships.  The local police HLS managers must be able to ascertain instant benefit 
from the process of information sharing, whereby it provides instant return that exceeds 
the cost of the effort to participate in the process.99  For the involved agencies, 
efficiencies are obtained when these easier-said-than-done activities are engaged readily 
and effectively.   
On this complex level, the local-level KM plan for action must enable internal 
focus on strategic pillars in such a manner that three results are generated.  First, the 
response must be organized in such a manner as to enable the involved managers to share 
information across agency cultures.  Second, these processes must enable the 
 
97 Paul, L. (2003).  Why three heads are better than one.  CIO, 94-106 
98 Horwitz, S. (2005). False alarm over unidentified plane tested emergency response.  The 
Washington Post, June 11 
99 Paul, L.  
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identification and embedding of tacit knowledge into organizational processes.  Finally, a 
climate for shared learning and growth must be cultivated.  That climate must ultimately 
facilitate the establishment of a unified knowledge network.   
Local police leaders and managers must accomplish all of these complex steps 
quickly because the competition, as it is embodied by the forces of international 
terrorism, has proven itself willing, able and active on a local level.  Within the new 
reality, police in the NCR are in direct competition, not only with criminals, but with 
terrorists as well.   In what is an appropriate analogy to the war on terror, Nonaka 
indicates that in any economy, the only certainty is uncertainty and that knowledge offers 
the best hope for competitive advantage.100  KM thus appears to offer a viable and 
reasonable process map for competitive advantage in the HLS mission. Indeed, the 
transition to KM is neither a panacea nor is it an overnight event.  Some might even view 
it as rather “pie in the sky.”  In spite of this type of assessment, the risks associated with 
the local fight against terrorism dictate action.  The potential rewards of a practical KM 
strategy appear to make this effort more than worthwhile, and the recommendations in 
this paper attempt to make KM at the local level both practical and achievable.  
  
 
100 Nonaka, I. (1991).  The knowledge-creating company.  Harvard Business Review On Knowledge 
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